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REPORT OF WORKING GROUP ON
REPRESENTING FIDUCIARIES*
INTRODUCTION

Following the general Conference plan, the working group first identified the broad range of ethical issues which could arise in the representation of fiduciaries. The group distinguished between the role of a lawyer
who represents a fiduciary individually, such as in a matter unrelated to
the fiduciary estate, or who advises the fiduciary in an action brought by
beneficiaries alleging wrongdoing on the part of the fiduciary, and the
role of a lawyer who represents a fiduciary serving in a fiduciary capacity.
The group focused its discussion on the latter role with emphasis on the
ethical dilemmas which arise when the lawyer becomes aware of actions
by the fiduciary which negatively impact some or all of the beneficiaries.
I. HYPOTHETICALS AND QUESTIONS RAISED
A.

Hypotheticals

To assist in the discussion, participants focused on the following two
hypotheticals developed by Professor Jeffrey Pennell:
1. Hypothetical (1)
The administrator of an estate (A) hired Lawyer (L) to represent A
and administer the pour over trust of decedent (D). The fiduciary is
D's son from a prior marriage. D's estate plan provides for his surviving spouse (S) for life, remainder to his children from the prior
marriage.
A controversy arises over how the estate should be managed. The
son wants to invest the trust so that it will grow during S's lifetime. S,
however, is concerned about paying for long-term care and wants the
trust to generate maximum income.
It appears to L that S's capacity is diminishing. She has no counsel
of her own. L learns that the children have secretly been using the
trust funds to make loans to their business.
2. Hypothetical (2)
Lawyer (L) represents a man (S) who is the guardian of the person
and substantial property of his father, who has mental disabilities. The
guardian is the father's sole heir.
L suspects that much of the father's confusion may be caused by the
medications he takes, but the son refuses to have the medications adjusted. S, claiming they are unnecessary luxuries which squander the
estate, refuses to pay for certain items for which the father expresses a
desire. L learns that S has misappropriated estate funds and that he
intends to conceal this in future accountings filed with the court.
* Group Leader: John Pickering. Staffperson: Stephanie Edelstein. Author: Jeffrey
Pennel. Participants: Stephanie Edelstein, Clifton Kruse, Jr., DaCosta Mason, Joan
O'Sullivan, Robert St. John, Thomas Sweeney, Joseph Wyatt, Jr., and Bernie Zaffern.
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Questions Raised

By asking and attempting to answer the following questions, participants sought to determine the parameters of representation of a fiduciary
serving in a fiduciary capacity. These individuals may include a trustee,
personal representative, an executor or administrator, or a guardian or
conservator. The group asked:
1. Who is the client?
a. The fiduciary?
b. The beneficiary of the fiduciary entity?
c. The entity itself?
2. To whom does the lawyer owe a duty?
a. To the fiduciary who hired the lawyer?
b. To the beneficiary of the fiduciary entity?
c. To third parties, for example, creditors?
d. To the entity itself?
e. Is the duty in guardianships higher than that in estates or trusts?
f. What happens if there are multiple fiduciaries who disagree or if
the interests of two or more beneficiaries are divided?
g. Can an attorney represent a fiduciary both as fiduciary and as an
individual?
3. From what source does the duty derive?
a. Is the duty ancillary to, or does it derive from, the attorneyclient relationship?
4. What obligations does the duty impose?
a. Can the lawyer disclose otherwise confidential information?
b. If so, to whom and under what circumstances?
c. Is the disclosure optional or mandatory?
5. How, and at what point, should the lawyer communicate the
boundaries of his or her role to the client?
a. Should the lawyer communicate this role to the beneficiaries?
b. To third parties?
c. If so, by what means?
II.

DISCUSSION

Members of the working group disagreed with respect to both the extent of a lawyer's duties and the party to whom those duties are owed.
All participants agreed, however, that consideration of these issues is
fundamental to any review of the role of the lawyer and that any effort to
resolve them must involve clarification of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), development of practice guidelines,
and education of the bar, the judiciary, and fiduciaries.
A. Existing Authority
The group first discussed the existing authority in the field. Professor
Pennell illustrates the ethical dilemmas most frequently encountered by
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lawyers representing fiduciaries.' Professor Pennell poses a series of hypothetical situations for discussion and notes that court decisions and
ethics opinions on these issues are limited, usually originating in the areas of legal malpractice, evidentiary privilege, and fee disputes. He analyzes existing treatises and opinions which have addressed the
relationships more comprehensively. These reach widely varying conclusions regarding to whom the lawyer's duties should flow, from what
source they derive, and the obligations they impose.
Noting the important distinction between the attorney-client relationship and the duties to non-clients which derive from that relationship,
Professor Pennell cautions against imposing "untenable or undefinable"
obligations on the lawyer. He does, however, recognize that the lawyer
who represents a fiduciary owes more to other fiduciaries and to beneficiaries than might be the case in different matters. Pennell concludes
that, in order to "do the right thing" and to avoid potential conflict or
confidentiality issues, the fiduciary entity should be the client, and the
lawyer should have discretion to act in the best interests of the entire
situation. If the fiduciary commits a breach, the lawyer thus could disclose this information to the beneficiaries because they would be part of
the entity client.
The American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and Trust Section ("ABA Section") takes a traditional approach. According to the
ABA Section, the fiduciary is the client and the lawyer has no affirmative
duty to inform beneficiaries of impropriety by the fiduciary. If, however,
the lawyer decides to withdraw, the manner of withdrawal may signal a
warning that something is wrong. The group asked what happens if the
beneficiaries do not understand the signal. In that case, the lawyer for
the guardian does not represent the ward and cannot reveal the guardian's misappropriation of funds.
Two other treatises consider the fiduciary entity to be the primary client and the fiduciary to be merely the agent of the entity.' The duty to a
beneficiary, including a ward, derives from the relationship to the entity
and requires that the lawyer disclose wrongdoing by the fiduciary. Hazard and Hodes cite an Arizona decision' in which the court found that
the lawyer for a guardian had a duty to protect the ward from injury by
the guardian and that, in fact, "the ward's interests overshadow those of
the guardian."
Finally, another commentator, Ronald Link, rejects the entity approach as too problematic and looks to the individual fiduciary as the
1. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Representations Involving FiduciaryEntities Who is the
Client?, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1319
(1994).
2. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawycring: A
Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1990); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis (1987).
3. See Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. 1976).
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client.4 Link also places on the lawyer a duty to disclose to both the
beneficiary and the court any wrongdoing by the fiduciary against the
beneficiary.
B. Representation
The working group attempted to develop practical answers to complex
problems, answers which make sense in everyday situations and which
reflect what ought to be rather than what is. Participants considered the
relevant Model Rules,5 the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Commentaries thereto ("ACTEC Commentaries"), 6 and the cases
and ethics opinions cited by Professor Pennell.7 The participants noted
that much of the existing authority on these issues has arisen in the context of disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The group agreed, however, that the purpose of this symposium was to consider representation
of fiduciaries in the context of what will benefit the public and not what is
necessary to protect the legal profession from liability. It was the opinion
of the working group that, in order to answer the fundamental questions
about conflicts and confidentiality, a lawyer must be aware of the boundaries of the representation and his or her obligations within those
boundaries.
1. The Client
While all agreed with Professor Pennell that lawyers must "do the
right thing," they rejected his theory that the only way to achieve this
goal is by representation of the fiduciary entity. Although the group
found the entity approach interesting and worthy of discussion, members
raised a number of concerns based on the lack of definition of both the
client and the lawyer's roles. They asked:
1. How is the entity defined?
2. From whom does the lawyer take direction?
3. How can a lawyer represent a group of people who may have conflicting value systems or interests?
4. What if some members of the entity lack the capacity to
participate?
5. How does the lawyer resign?
6. What if the beneficiaries sue the fiduciary?
7. Who can fire the lawyer?
4. See Ronald C. Link, Significant New Developments in Probate and Trust Law
Practice, Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1991).
5. The working group considered the following Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.6 on Confidentiality; Rules 1.7 and 1.9 on Conflict of Interest; Rule 1.13 on
Organization as Client; and, to a lesser extent, Rule 2.2 on Lawyer as Intermediary.
6. See American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, Commentaries on the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Oct. 18, 1993) [hereinafter ACTEC Commentaries].
7. See Pennell, supra note 1.
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8. If the fiduciary fires the lawyer, couldn't the other members of the
entity just rehire?
a. Would this create a conflict?
b. Should it?
9. Doesn't the entity theory just turn the lawyer into a free-floating
authority, independent of whoever actually did the hiring?
Some participants were also concerned that the entity theory could not
be applied to guardianships, especially guardianships of the person.
They queried whether a guardianship of a person, focused on the best
interest of an individual ward who may lack capacity to make decisions,
can be treated like a trust or decedent's estate, focused on a larger group
of persons with competing interests or on a corporation with its board of
directors, all of whom are presumed to be competent.
The group considered whether the relationship between the lawyer for
the fiduciary and the beneficiary rises to the attorney-client level. The
group rapidly determined that it does not, in large part, because of the
potential for conflict. Every participant was of the opinion that the lawyer's duties and responsibilities to the beneficiary arise out of the relationship to the fiduciary. Although the group waited to define those
duties later in the session, the members agreed that these duties were
different from those owed to the fiduciary. The group thus concluded
that, without question, the fiduciary should be the client.
To a lesser extent, the group also discussed potential conflicts between
the parties to the fiduciary entity and the role of the lawyer with regard
to those parties. The group asked with whom the lawyer's loyalties lie if
there are multiple fiduciaries who disagree, if the fiduciaries and beneficiaries disagree, or if the interests of two or more fiduciaries are divided.
The group asked to what extent conflicts are created when a lawyer represents a fiduciary both as fiduciary and in some other capacity. Finally,
the group asked what the lawyer should do in the event of such a
conflict.'
2. Duty
All working group members agreed that the relationship of a lawyer to
a fiduciary is different from the typical attorney-client relationship because a fiduciary, in addition to being concerned with his or her own
interests, owes a duty to beneficiaries, to third parties, including creditors, and to the court. This led the group to ask several questions:
1. Who are the beneficiaries?
2. Are they only those persons with a direct interest in the actions of
the fiduciary?
a. In a life estate, for example, are they remainderpersons?
b. Are they creditors?
8. The group considered Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 in this discussion.
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c. In a guardianship, are heirs or family members of the ward considered beneficiaries?
3. Is there some higher standard of duty in a guardianship, when the
direct beneficiary is incapacitated?
4. What about third parties?
5. Does the lawyer become a super-fiduciary, or free-floating authority, who must oversee the fiduciary's actions independent of the person
who hired him or her?
6. Does the duty continue if the attorney-client relationship is
terminated?
The group agreed that the lawyer is not a super-fiduciary and does not
owe the same duty to the entire universe. Like the ACTEC Commentary
to Model Rule 1.2, the group decided that the scope of those duties depends upon the "nature and extent of the representation and the terms of
any understanding or agreement among the parties." Participants concluded that the lawyer has ancillary duties to the fiduciary, and to other
parties where appropriate, such as the duties of good faith, loyalty, due
care, diligence, and rightful distribution. Some duties derive from the
representation of the fiduciary and include treating the beneficiary with
fairness. Some duties are created by public policy, statute, or court rule.
The group moved beyond the ACTEC position, however, and found
that, in certain circumstances such as guardianships, the lawyer may be
held to higher standards. One participant commented that the fiduciary's actions in guardianships could have greater immediate consequences because the beneficiary's life may be on the line. The group also
concluded that, if there is a duty and the relationship which gave rise to
that duty is terminated, the duty may continue until it is satisfied.
The ethical dilemma confronting a lawyer who becomes aware that the
fiduciary-client is engaged in wrongdoing or, perhaps, in legitimate activity which will harm one or more of the beneficiaries was at the root of the
debate. The group asked what, if anything, the lawyer can do to notify
the affected parties and if fiduciary representation is different from other
practices. Building on earlier discussions, the group concluded that fiduciary representation certainly is different from adversarial practice in that
the lawyer for a fiduciary has duties to the non-clients which are unlike
any others.
3. Confidentiality
The group next discussed whether, under what circumstances, and to
whom these duties allow the lawyer to disclose otherwise confidential
information concerning the actions of the fiduciary. The group asked:
1. Does disclosure depend on the nature of the actions or of the
information?
2. Does the fiduciary have the right to prevent the lawyer from revealing confidential information to the beneficiaries?
Participants suggested several scenarios for discussion:
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1. The fiduciary makes a legitimate judgment call which will benefit
some persons, but adversely affect others;
2. The fiduciary in some way breaches fiduciary duty;
3. The breach is fraudulent or criminal; and
4. The lawyer discovers that the fiduciary is planning to commit said
breach.
The traditional view, as articulated by the ABA Section, is that a lawyer who becomes aware of a breach of responsibility has no duty to notify
the beneficiaries but instead has the option to effect a "noisy withdrawal." The group discussed the concept of the noisy withdrawal and
concluded that it is not an appropriate way to handle the majority of
fiduciary representations. For example, in a trust or probate estate there
is at least some chance that the beneficiaries will be able to look out for
their own interests. There is little such chance in guardianships, however, where the beneficiary, in all likelihood, does not have the capacity
to understand either the reasons for or the process of withdrawal. The
group also decided that neither the Model Rules nor the ACTEC Commentaries provide much guidance on the confidentiality issue. While the
entity theory allows for disclosures, on the premise that no duties of confidentiality are owed to individuals, the participants decided that this theory raises too many potential problems to be an acceptable answer to this
ethical dilemma.
Thus the group concluded unanimously that the lawyer for the fiduciary should not be prohibited from disclosing otherwise confidential information which would negatively impact the beneficiary. The group acted
on the assumption that the great majority of lawyers are ethical, practice
with care, and require the option of disclosure should the circumstances
warrant. The group engaged in lively discussion as to whether disclosure
should be mandatory, with one member of the group arguing that it
should because of the unique nature of the relationships. This argument
did not sway the majority of participants, however, who wanted to give
lawyers the option of disclosure without subjecting them to sanctions for
failing to do so. There was consensus among the working group that a
lawyer for a fiduciary must disclose fraudulent or criminal conduct by
the fiduciary of which the lawyer becomes aware with the assumption
that, with the mandate, comes the potential for sanctions for noncompliance.
The consensus of the group was that a lawyer should disclose to parties to whom the fiduciary owes a duty, including any beneficiary. The
lawyer should also disclose to third parties, such as heirs or creditors,
depending upon the circumstances. Understanding that not all fiduciary
estates are subject to ongoing supervision by a court, the working group
decided that a lawyer should have the leeway to report wrongdoing to
any court having jurisdiction.
This decision led the group to ask what the lawyer's responsibility is to
supervise the actions of the fiduciary so as to be aware of such conduct.
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Trying once again to avoid turning the lawyer into a super-fiduciary who
is responsible for all that occurs, the group decided to limit the issue to
information of which the lawyer, acting with due care, becomes aware.
4.

Communication to the Fiduciary

The group was united in its decision not to look just at what happens
when there is a breach of duty by the fiduciary, the default rule, but to
examine practical solutions which can help avoid the problem altogether.
The group then asked at what point, and in what manner, a client or
potential client should be advised of the lawyer's derivative duties to the
beneficiary.
As at least a partial solution, the group decided that the lawyer should
follow the ACTEC Commentary to Model Rule 1.6 and both should discuss with the fiduciary the respective roles of the fiduciary and the lawyer
and should memorialize these roles in writing at the outset of the representation. Participants cautioned that a lawyer should not agree to any
limitations on the derivative duties running to a beneficiary as a result of
the representation. If potential conflicts arise, these should also be laid
out in the letter. While these actions will not resolve all issues of concern, the discussion and writing will provide the client with notice of the
lawyer's obligations and, perhaps, will serve as a deterrent to activities
which might be subject to disclosure.
Members of the group were interested to learn that it is not universal
practice to prepare retainer agreements or letters of engagement, particularly when the lawyer and the client have an ongoing relationship. Some
members were concerned that such a writing requirement would impede
the smooth development of the attorney-client relationship. The group
agreed that a letter of agreement is sound business practice. While it
need not be so formal as to set up a barrier, such a writing can explain
the nature of the lawyer's role and responsibilities to the fiduciary and to
any beneficiaries in a manner which is helpful to both lawyer and client.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The working group did not intend its discussions and conclusions to
imply that all fiduciaries engage in wrongdoing, that all beneficiaries are
in need of protection, or that a lawyer who represents a fiduciary acting
in a fiduciary capacity owes no duties of loyalty or care to the fiduciary
client. To the contrary, participants approached their task with the understanding that lawyers are not super-fiduciaries and should not be
placed in the difficult position of overseeing every act of the fiduciary.
However, participants also recognized that there are special circumstances in fiduciary representation, indeed the very fact that the client is a
fiduciary, which merit a high standard of care. They concluded that a
lawyer needs guidance on the extent of his or her duties and
responsibilities.
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At the plenary session, the working group presented its recommendations on interpretations of the Model Rules, practice guidelines, and education. These recommendations evolved from a series of resolutions
developed and drafted by the group, as a whole, during the final session.
It was the consensus of the group that the issue presented to the plenary
session, and the recommendations for implementation, should incorporate the fundamental principles developed during the two intense days of
discussion. Unfortunately, the group did not have sufficient time to address the conflict questions beyond a recognition that, in their current
form, Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 are not particularly applicable to fiduciary
situations. The group recommended these issues for further study.
In conclusion, the group drafted and passed the following resolutions,
upon which they based their recommendations presented at the plenary
session:
A. That the lawyer for a fiduciary, acting in any fiduciary capacity,
may communicate otherwise confidential information to any court
having jurisdiction, and to parties to whom the fiduciary owes duties.
1. Minority View
That the lawyer has an obligation to communicate confidential information if the lawyer becomes aware of criminal actions by the
fiduciary.
B. That the fiduciary is the client, not the beneficiaries. The lawyer
has derivative duties to the beneficiaries as a result of the representation of the fiduciary. Disclosures relating to those duties are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation. See Model Rule
1.6(a).
C. That this issue be clarified by court rule.
D. That this group has rejected the entity theory.
E. That Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9 are not well-suited to fiduciary representations where there is no adversity, and in which the lawyer represents more than one interest. For example, can a lawyer represent
co-fiduciaries, or a fiduciary and a beneficiary?
F. We recommend further study with regard to the Rules' application to these conflict situations.
G. That it is good practice to discuss with the fiduciary the respective
roles and responsibilities of both the lawyer and the fiduciary, and to
memorialize these roles in writing. The lawyer should not agree with
the fiduciary to any limitations on derivative duties to the beneficiary.
H. That educational materials describing the duties and responsibilities of fiduciaries and their lawyers should
9 be developed for the guidance of the bench, bar, and fiduciaries.
9. For the full text of the Recommendations of this working group, see Conference

on Ethical Issues in Representing Older Clients, Recommendations, in Ethical Issues in
Representing Older Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 989 (1994).

